Call this the Meno problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem. Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value.
October 12, at 5: Tradeoffs will be difficult to determine, of course that is no excuse not to try. When we are less certain about tradeoffs, we should be less certain about the best course of action. And yes, even if I am convinced of the merits of some policy, even if I can point to a group of specialists who agree about this policy, we are for better and for worse constrained in enacting it.
October 20, at 7: Clearly, the interface between the two is worthy of its own discourse; yet, wherever the line is drawn I feel that the position of the French government is utterly reasonable.
This is not to say that I in anyway discount the virtue of the intellectual, or their importance to the furtherance of society. Rather, I believe those with an inclination toward innovation, the abstract, and the inane-but-invaluable depths of knowledge and exploration are those with an inherent affinity for the exploration of the facets of our existence; yet we have a system hell-bent on promoting knowledge over vocation.
That said, the primary focus of the educational system as a whole should clearly be more vocational in scope and strive to prepare individuals for their life, and their world, as they will experience it.
With little exception, those whom attempt to define knowledge as a virtue unto itself are those whom in absence of this definition would posses little virtue.
October 22, at I have a few thoughts about your very interesting remarks. Academics, as I noted in my original post, have every interest in believing that their knowledge is profoundly important; college students, as far as I can make out your view here, basically want to go to college to get something useful to themselves.
Probably a job, you seem to think. Something can only be practical in relation to some particular person or group. In a sense, for instance, there is something deeply practical about writing scholarly articles: So, yes, on one hand, I agree with you that a lot of scholarly research is rather arcane and I certainly support making it more immediately relevant or beneficial to society at large.
I mean, working tech support for comcast or making hamburgers or being a lawyer for the insurance industry?
All those are pretty existentially unsatisfying in the long run. I for one prefer the values of academia to those of most other public spheres in America these days. I admit that I have every material interest, as a would-be academic, in saying that I support academic values!
October 23, at The philosopher would do well to know how to use a table saw, so that he might not need to call the carpenter to build his bookshelf. The inverse of this conjecture is of doubtful practicality. In full disclosure, I harbor no ill-will towards you, your education, or the virtue of your study, as you well know.
October 23, at 1: Many carpenters, remember, work on absolutely ridiculous construction projects like mansions for the affluent or new shopping plazas. You know, hippie utopia world.
Just to take one example, pork barrel military spending sounds very practical at first glance — it brings jobs to your state! Not so; I agree philosophically with definition 1but I just want to point out that people have to do all kinds of things to get by in this world that are crackpot in the last analysis but that make sense at the time, and this I think we have to recognize has a very practical logic to it.As far as the “effortless” or “effortful” aspect of knowledge is concerned, one might wish to take into consideration a proposal of so called “native knowledge”, according to adherents of such a view, there are certain aspects of knowledge that we are born with.
Much of what we know and value, is justified through strong and solid reasoning and proof, such as Mathematical and scientific formulas; but a lot of significant knowledge which is believed in and seen of great importance, cannot be proven in the same way, and is justified in a very different manner.
Focusing on virtue epistemology, Pritchard’s extensive survey covers most works on the value of knowledge that had been published up to It also treats some nonstandard, though related, subjects such as the relation between epistemic value and the problem of skepticism, and the value of true belief.
Pritchard, Duncan H., and John Turri. An appreciation of the dual role of knowledge and values in this regard suggests that we need to work on both axes: improving knowledge and influencing values. The more we know about a problem, the more options we are able to apply towards solving it. Intellectual integrity is something we should deeply value.
they forged a new path toward intellectual integrity, a path that resulted in .
explanations for the value of knowledge. One explains why we value other people's knowledge, while the other explains why we value our own knowledge. Both of these explanations are based, however, on prop?
erties of knowledge which are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge.